Innovation in the start-up market is a key determinant of economic growth. But what determines an inventor's decision to begin a new venture and his or her subsequent innovation?
staged databases such as VentureXpert. CrunchBase lists over 200,000 companies and 600,000 entrepreneurs, including extensive detail on the investments, products, and acquisitions of each company. I augment this data in three important ways. First, I scrape the employment history of each entrepreneur from LinkedIn. Second, I hand-collect SIC codes for each start-up, employing
CrunchBase product market descriptions and industry categories. Last, I match the CrunchBase entrepreneurs to inventors in the universe of patent data in NBER and EPO Patstat using the employment history, location, and age of the entrepreneurs. To my knowledge, this represents the first dataset of inventors ex-ante linked to entrepreneurs and their innovation post-entrepreneurship.
To this extent, my final constructed dataset comprises a panel of inventors, their entrepreneurship choices, and their patents as they move through time and across firms. This paper includes three main contributions. My first contribution is to document the causal effect of acquirer market structure on innovation in terms of quantity, quality, and catering. The specification of interest would be one with measures of ex-ante acquirer market structure on the right-hand side and measures of innovation on the left-hand side. However, examining the causal implications of acquirer concentration on start-up innovation requires a methodology that resolves endogeneity and self-selection problems. I address these problems by exploiting plausibly exogenous differences in entrepreneurs' ex-ante acquisition markets as follows:
For each entrepreneur, I proxy for the acquisition market using the citers of the entrepreneur's prior patents. I then match entrepreneurs on observables such as prior industry and prior innovation quality. Consider the example of two inventors, Tony and Sean, who work in the same industry prior to beginning a start-up at time t. Both inventors are equally innovative and retain the same number of patents and citations. The only difference between Tony and Sean is the identity of the firms citing their patents. If Tony's citers are in heavily concentrated markets, will Tony be more or less likely to become an entrepreneur? Conditional on Tony starting a new venture, will he choose to cater to potential acquirers by innovating in technological areas that potential acquirers value?
One might argue that a potential caveat to a causal interpretation of my results is the unobserved heterogeneity in prior patents. The results may be biased if an omitted variable exists that is correlated with both prior patent citers and ex-post innovation but is uncorrelated with industry fixed effects and prior innovation fixed effects. If monopolistic companies cite Tony's prior patents because he is developing "hotter" patents, controlling for patent count and citations per patent, then the relationship between acquirer market structure and future innovation is correlational at best. However, I directly test Woolridge proxy conditions and show that, conditional on where the entrepreneur previously worked and how innovative he or she is, the assignment of citers on prior patents is orthogonal to unexplained variation in post-entrepreneurship innovation. 5 Additionally, in order for the proxy to be informative, the ex-ante citers need to accurately forecast the ex-post acquisition market. I find that citers predict ex-post acquirers for the subset of start-ups that experience an acquisition exit event. This implies that the most likely buyers of start-ups are the prior citers of said start-ups' entrepreneurs. Interestingly, start-ups and prior citers (and thus, potential acquirers) do not necessarily compete in the same product market, indicating a difference between technological acquisitions and acquisitions to deter competition.
I find that when facing concentrated acquiring markets, entrepreneurs increase innovation quality and catering. The effects are economically and statistically significant. A one standard deviation increase in acquirer market concentration predicts 16% higher patent quality, defined as citations per patent. Additionally, a one standard deviation increase in the size of the acquisition market as measured by sales increases citations by 7%. Given that the average number of citations per patent in the sample is approximately 12, this implies that when comparing a concentrated industry, such as pharmaceuticals, to a more competitive industry, such as software, the quality of patents produced by entrepreneurs increases by two citations per patent. I also find strong evidence of catering to potential acquirers, defined as technological proximity in patent portfolios. The patent portfolios of entrepreneurs overlap those of the potential acquirers 9% more with a one standard deviation increase in acquirer market concentration and 5% more with a one standard deviation increase in market size.
The evidence supports the Schumpeter view that incumbents value innovation more in concentrated industries because monopolists can more effectively appropriate the benefits of innovation and scale.
This implies that acquirers benefit more from acquiring start-ups that innovate. Furthermore, the effect of scaling intensifies with catering innovation, due to the ease with which the acquirer can apply the new technology to their existing product or technology clusters. This resembles the recent empirical work by Zhao (2009) and Bena and Li (2014) . Both sets of authors find that technological overlap drives mergers and acquisitions in public companies. I show that this incentive bears implications on the innovation strategy of entrepreneurs, specifically in concentrated acquisition markets due to scaling. In particular, entrepreneurs target acquisitions by catering innovation in the potential acquirers' technological area.
The recent acquisition of Gloucester Pharmaceuticals by pharmaceutical giant Celgene (CELG) illustrates the effect of scale and market structure on entrepreneurs' incentive to cater innovation in terms of technological overlap. First, Gloucester Pharmaceuticals alluded to benefits of monopoly power present in this deal, stating that, "we are thrilled with this transaction because Celgene's global leadership in the development and commercialization of innovative treatments for hematologic diseases makes them ideally suited to bring the clinical benefits of Istodax to patients." 6 Second, Gloucester acknowledged the ease with which their main compound, Romidepsin, a last- I find that concentrated acquiring markets deter inventors from entering into entrepreneurship. A one standard deviation increase in acquirer market concentration decreases the probability that an inventor becomes an entrepreneur by 4%. I find a similar directional and significant effect of acquirer market size. This is consistent with at least two economic mechanisms. First, fragmented markets attract more entry. In a concentrated market, the risk of potential acquirers extending into the product market with or without the inventor increases. Inventors anticipate increased hesitation to "face off" against large monopolists, reducing their inclination to begin a company in the first place. Second, entrepreneurs are unlikely to extract a high acquisition price from the monopolist due to the lack of outside options and low bargaining power.
6 See Celgene's press release, "Celgene Completes Acquisition of Gloucester Pharmaceuticals" on January 15, 2010 at http://ir.celgene.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=799365.
My third contribution is to analyze the changes to innovation due to acquirer market structure and size, conditional on entry. The challenge in this analysis is, of course, that entry into entrepreneurship is not random. For example, if inventors who are low quality ex-post chose not to become entrepreneurs, then the analysis would overestimate the quality of innovation in the data. To account for non-random selection into entrepreneurship, I employ the Heckman two-stage estimation method to address potential bias. The results of the two-stage Heckman correction resemble the prior innovation results in direction and size. Both acquirer market concentration and size increase innovation quality (citations per patent) and catering (technological proximity in patents). The economic magnitudes suggest that the positioning of entrepreneurs to prepare for the acquisition market has first order effect on decision making and real output. This paper contributes to a variety of literatures. First, this paper contributes to the long-standing industrial organization literature on market concentration and innovation (Schumpeter, 1942 Furthermore, this paper provides a link between the industrial organization literature on concentration and the corporate finance literature. Prior M&A research has demonstrated the importance of mergers and acquisitions on innovation but has devoted less attention to the role of entrepreneurship and new start-ups (Bena and Li, 2014; Seru, 2014) . Theoretically, Phillips and Zhdanov (2013) demonstrate that large firms may choose to outsource innovation to avoid R&D races with smaller firms. Large firms can minimize R&D risk by only acquiring small firms that successfully innovate. This paper documents this acquisition market in a start-up setting while further investigating its implications on entrepreneurial decision-making.
Conversely, prior entrepreneurship research has primarily documented the role of funding on innovation with little focus on the role of acquisitions (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Hirukawa and Ueda, 2011; Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2013; Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar, 2014; Gonzalez-Uribe, 2014). This paper, on the other hand, documents a different mechanism for accessing equity markets and thus, a different set of innovation incentives. A recent paper by Hombert, Schoar, Sraer, and Thesmar (2014) also focuses on the effect of changing rents from entrepreneurship and innovation instead of the funding inputs by evaluating unemployment reform. However, the authors of that paper study small business entrepreneurs compared to the high-technology entrepreneurs examined in this paper.
Finally, this paper contributes to the broad literature on the various incentives to innovate. Manso (2011) shows that the optimal incentive scheme to motivate innovation exhibits tolerance for early failure and reward for later success. A separate and extensive set of papers studies how corporate governance affects innovation, focusing on determinants such as the firm's decision to go public (Bernstein, 2012), ownership structure (Ferreira, Manso, and Silva, 2012) , and anti-takeover provisions (Atanassov, 2013; Chemmanur and Tian, 2013) . Acemoglu, Akcigitz, and Celik (2015) focus on yet another aspect -openness to disruption -as a key determinant of creative innovation. This paper addresses a different motivating factor in an entrepreneur's decision to innovate -the market structure of acquirers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I discuss the related theoretical literature and develop the competing hypotheses for my empirical analysis in Section II. Section III describes data sources and sample construction. Section IV describes the methodology employed to causally identify the effect of acquirer market structure on innovation. Section V presents the main empirical results on both entrepreneurship and innovation. Section VI concludes the paper.
Theoretical Foundations
I consider the entrepreneurs' choice of effort to produce high quality innovation as well as how much to cater. High quality innovations have more widespread impact but quality may come at the expense of time consumed for additional inventions or on marketing and business development in commercialization. Entrepreneurs can cater innovation in terms of choosing to innovate proximally -innovating in the same technology area -as potential acquirers. Innovating in established technological areas contributes incrementally to the entire pursuit of science while innovating in novel areas creates new technology clusters of growth, relative to the acquirer.
In particular, I clarify that two leading types of theoretical models in the industrial organization and the M&A literature, namely the Schumpeter view and the Arrow view, lead to predictions pointing in two antithetical directions, making this an empirical question that requires resolution.
Direction 1: Concentration Increases Innovation
Multiple lines of theoretical and empirical work can be extended to predict that increases in acquirer market concentration can increase the incentive for entrepreneurs to innovate. The classical Schumpeterian argument for innovation is that reductions in competition and increases in scale both increase the incentive to invent by making it easier for firms to appropriate the benefits from innovation. The R&D scale effects have received significant attention in the organizational economics literature. For example, Henderson and Cockburn (1996) and Cohen and Klepper (1996a) identify project spillovers and cost-spreading benefits. Cohen, Levin, and Mowery (1987) argue that complementarities between innovation and non-manufacturing activities, such as distribution, marketing, and operational expertise, may be better developed within large firms. The possibility of an acquisition amplifies this potential gain from innovation since the merged entity can apply the innovation to the entire product line (Phillips and Zhdanov, 2013) . Additionally, Salop (1977) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) argue that competition decreases the monopoly rents that reward new innovation and thus generates a positive relationship between concentration and innovation. To the extent that the most substantial gains from innovation accrue in imperfectly competitive markets, potential acquirers in concentrated industries have more incentive to purchase innovation. While whether this increases the probability or the price of acquisitions is vague, both will incentivize entrepreneurs to pursue innovation more aggressively. 7 
Concentration Increases Catering Innovation
Less competitive markets, under Schumpeter's view, also increase incentives for start-ups to engage in proximal innovation by increasing the synergies from technological overlap. Bena and Li (2014) show that technological complementarity results in increased merger incidence. They conclude that higher overlap in the same technology space leads to synergy gains above and beyond the returns to innovation conducted by each firm individually. The acquisition of the geo platform, Mixer Labs, by Twitter exemplifies the role that technological synergies play. The acquisition was 7 If we assume that the target holds some bargaining power that yields a set proportion of the overall acquisition surplus, then increasing the surplus increases the premium. triggered by 1) complementarity of Mixer Labs' geotag technology with that of Twitter' and 2) the ease and applicability of the technology to Twitter's own core product, tweets. Akcigit and Kerr (2010) reinforce this in their study of the tradeoffs between exploitation (similar in concept to proximal innovation) and exploration innovation. The authors find that exploitation R&D scales more strongly with firm size. Thus, the monopolist's ability to scale more efficiently implies larger returns and a higher premium for acquisitions with technological overlap.
Direction 2: Concentration Decreases Innovation
The competing hypothesis stems from Arrow (1962) . Arrow shows that a monopolist that is not exposed to competition or potential competition is less likely to engage in innovation. A firm with monopoly power maintains a flow of profits that it enjoys if no innovation occurs, implying a low net profit from acquiring innovation. A monopolist can increase its profits by acquiring a start-up; however, it cannibalizes the profits from its own legacy technology in doing so. If the competitive acquirer can capture the same benefit from innovation, its differential return is higher because it has no profits to cannibalize. Furthermore, increased competition among acquirers increases the bargaining power of targets. With more competition among potential acquirers, entrepreneurs will capture a greater fraction of the acquisition surplus. Last, even minor product differentiation in contestable markets enables companies, in this case, acquirers, to capture market share (Baumol, 1982) . It often is not only recommended but also necessary for firms to innovate because competition decreases pre-innovation rents, thereby increasing the incremental profits from innovating. Innovation, however marginal, can help firms "escape competition." All three arguments imply that the value of innovation increases under competition, and incumbents are more likely to acquire entrepreneurs who innovate.
Concentration Decreases Catering Innovation
The negative effect of concentration on innovation is stronger for catering innovation. Arrow's displacement effect is larger when new products intrude on the existing market for older products, than when products appeal to a new segment of the market and expand the market base. Proximal innovation builds directly on an acquirer's existing technology and increases the risk of cannibalization. In this scenario, highly concentrated markets might encourage entrepreneurs to innovate in new technologies. This implies that the acquisition premium a monopolist will be willing to pay for proximal innovation will be lower than the acquisition premium for differentiated innovation. An anecdotal example is Google's acquisition of home automation company, Nest Labs. Nest's technology created an entirely new product line in which Google had not previously invested. Google justified the high acquisition price as a way of accessing an undeveloped market. Google envisioned beyond Nest's current line, imagining a world of heating, lighting, and appliances all connected and responsive to users. Thus, the negative effect of acquirer market concentration on entrepreneurial innovation is stronger for proximal innovation.
Data and Sample Creation
I test the effect of acquirer market structure on the propensity of inventors to become entrepreneurs and on their subsequent innovation. One difficulty in answering this question arises from the lack of data regarding early-stage start-ups and entrepreneurs. In this section, I describe the various data sources and the methodology used to construct a novel dataset of inventors ex-ante matched to entrepreneurs and their ex-post innovation.
Institutional Setting and CrunchBase
Start-up companies, newly created companies designed to search for a scalable business model, are traditionally financed by venture capital funds. The start-up market has experienced two shifts in recent times. First, the acquisition market plays a comparatively larger role in start-ups exiting from initial financiers. Second, lower fixed costs have allowed entrepreneurs to shift away from venture capital (VC) and toward smaller angel funds. In the technology industry alone, angels fund 10,000 companies every year, while venture capitalists fund only 1,500 companies. Figure 1 shows the number of angel and venture seed rounds from the 2000s onward. The number of angel seed rounds outnumbers the VC seed rounds by a factor of 100. The third and perhaps most innovative feature of CrunchBase is that it sources data from the crowd.
CrunchBase reports more than 50 thousand individual contributors and more than 2 million active users. Data is constantly reviewed and monitored by both editors and machines to prevent against inaccurate or duplicate information.
These unique features of CrunchBase data provide several distinct advantages. First, it does not require a start-up to receive venture capital financing. This means the CrunchBase sample includes start-ups financed entirely by bootstrapping, angel investors, or crowd-funding, sources otherwise excluded in VentureOne and VentureXpert. Second, the aggregation of data from the greater web mitigates some concerns regarding data selection with self-reporting that affect existing For each entrepreneur, I further collect employment data from LinkedIn. While CrunchBase contains some individual-level employment and demographic data, it remains largely incomplete for the less successful entrepreneurs. LinkedIn provides not only the company at which entrepreneurs were previously employed but also their tenure. Employment and tenure data are necessary for the disambiguation and matching of entrepreneurs to inventors. The ability to track entrepreneurs across time is crucial to the identification strategy explained in the next section.
Comparing CrunchBase data to other datasets, it is worth noting that, in addition to missing a significant amount of early-stage entrepreneurial activity, VentureXpert contains less data on many of the companies in the most innovative industries. Jane Doe from the CrunchBase data will match multiple inventor Jane Does from the patent data.
Each inventor Jane Doe will be associated with a set of patents and assignees (the corporation that owns the patent). While each inventor Jane Doe is disambiguated, defined as having a unique identifier in the patent database, the difficulty lies in assigning the correct inventor-to-entrepreneur 11 The matching algorithm weights last names more heavily than first names since last names are much less likely to be susceptible to abbreviations or mistakes.
match.
In order to solve this problem and remove the false positive name matches, I compare the entrepreneur's past employers with the various inventors' patent assignees. If any of the entrepreneur's past employers match any of the inventors' patent assignees, then the unique inventor identifier associated with that assignee is retrieved and matched to the entrepreneur. 12 In the rare cases of multiple employer-assignee matches within the fuzzy name subsample, I verify again using the location or age of the entrepreneur. With the unique inventor-identifiers in hand, the final merge with the NBER and Patstat patent databases yields a panel that tracks entrepreneurs and their patent portfolios through time and space.
The resulting sample consists of 6,626 entrepreneur-firm pairs with 5,568 unique entrepreneurs.
Conditional on patenting, each entrepreneur produces an average 8.17 patents over his or her lifetime. Within the patent database, inventors produce an average of 1.39 patents. Thus, entrepreneurial inventors are much more proficient than the average inventor. In my empirical strategy, I use the prior patent citers (forward citation assignee) as a proxy for potential acquirers.
When I focus on entrepreneurs who have produced at least one patent in the four years prior to start-up founding, I am left with 2,484 entrepreneurs with an average of 9.7 patents each.
Finally, I link the patent citers to financial data from Compustat by using unique PDPASS identifiers from the NBER patent database. I match citing patent IDs in order to retrieve a PDPASS and a matched GVKEY for each citing patent assignee. While this initially limits the universe of citers to public companies, firm-level financial data is necessary to construct measures of industry concentration. In order to remove this restriction, I hand-collect SIC industry codes for each citer or potential acquirer. This expands the universe of acquirers to both private companies and companies with missing data in Compustat. 12 The match procedure, first fuzzy string matching past employers with patent assignees in order to retrieve a firm identifier from the patent data; then, fuzzy string matching names from the firm's inventor pool with entrepreneur names in CrunchBase. This performs less effectively since assignees in the NBER patent database are only disambiguated until 2000. An initial match using last names bypasses the more common abbreviation problems that accompany company names.
Innovation Outcomes
While patents have long been recognized as a rich data source for the study of innovation and technological change, a considerable limitation is that not all inventions are patented. 13 Barring this limitation, patent citations maintain the distinct advantage of establishing invention, inventor, and assignee networks that are crucial to studying technical change and overlap. Additionally, the incentives to patent are clear. Inventors are granted monopoly rights to their innovation in exchange for disclosure.
Following Halle, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) , I employ patent application stock and forward citations per patent to measure innovative output and quality. Patent application stock refers to the number of patent applications attributed to the inventor. Although patent count is an indicator of "knowledge stock," innovations may vary widely in their technological and economic significance.
To this extent, Halle et al. argue for the usefulness of citation count as an important indicator of patent importance, which also allows for gauging the heterogeneity in the "value" of patents. 14 I use the same length of time interval to count patent and citation information, irrespective of application date, in order to allow for comparable measures.
To measure catering, I employ two measures of technological overlap. First, I utilize Jaffe's Technological Proximity (TP) measure to gauge the closeness of any two firms' innovation activities in the technology space using patent counts in different technology classes. Technology classes are an elaborate classification system developed by the USPTO for the technologies to which patented inventions belong. Approximately 400 three-digit patent classes and 120,000 patent subclasses exist. Each patent is assigned a class and subclass and an unlimited number of subsidiary classes and subclasses. Halle, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) further aggregate the 400 patent classes into coarser two-digit technological subcategories. I rely on both three-digit and two-digit technology classes. Since each market may comprise more than two firms, I take the average TP to obtain a product market level measure. In the appendix, I also employ the Mutual Citation (MC) measure, which shows the extent to which a firm's patent portfolio is directly cited by another firm.
Within my paper's context, this can be interpreted in two directions. One direction, the extent to which the acquirer's patent portfolio directly cites the start-up firm's patent portfolio, captures the immediate usefulness of a start-up firm's innovative activity to a potential acquirer. The other direction, the extent to which the start-up firm's patent portfolio directly cites the acquirer's patent portfolio, captures the improvement or degree of "pushing the envelope" of the acquirer's existing technologies. Both directions represent a convergence between the entrepreneurs' and the acquirers' patent portfolios.
Identification Strategy
I begin by examining how the level of concentration in acquirer markets affects patent application stock, citations per patent, and technological proximity in start-up markets. I then address how concentration affects an inventor's incentive to become an entrepreneur initially and I incorporate the analysis into a Heckman specification to address potential self-selection into the sample.
The primitive specification of interest relates acquirer concentration to start-up innovation, as follows:
Concentration and measures of innovation are defined for each entrepreneur i facing acquirer market j at time t where t is the time of start-up founding. I index innovation by entrepreneur instead of by firm for two reasons. First, patent portfolios exist at the inventor level. Second, this paper addresses the incentives and innovative choices made by entrepreneurs. By matching entrepreneurs to inventor-level patent data, I construct a history of patent activity for each entrepreneur. This allows me to control for individual-specific characteristics rather than only the firm-level characteristics in prior papers -particularly when accounting for self-selection.
Without stronger exogeneity conditions, the coefficient β 1 is only evidence of correlation between concentration and innovation. One issue preventing a causal interpretation is reverse causality. 
Proxy Variable Method
The construction of a measure of acquirer market structure must overcome two major hurdles.
First, a majority of entrepreneurs in the sample have not experienced an exit event. Hence, no acquirer exists, which renders the utilization of acquirer market structure impossible. Second, even in the case of acquisition, the final acquisition market need not be the one that the entrepreneur might have envisioned ex-ante when making decisions regarding the start-up venture and catering innovation. For example, Nest Inc.'s ultimate acquisition by Google does not imply that Nest only positioned itself for acquisition by Google. In other words, the analysis requires a variable that captures the ex-ante acquisition market at the time of start-up founding.
I construct a proxy measure of acquirer markets using the patent assignees of citations (citers) received by each entrepreneur before start-up founding. As a simple example, consider Nest Inc.
founder Tony Fadell. Prior to starting Nest Inc., he worked as an engineer at Apple. During that time, he was the inventor on one patent application, cited by Samsung, IBM, and Google. By construction, the industries of Samsung, IBM, and Google comprise Tony's acquirer market.
Using the patenting history of entrepreneurs, I test and conclude that citers of prior patents are exante the most likely future acquirers, and accurately predict ex-post acquisition markets. 15 
I verify
Woolridge proxy conditions to confirm that the coefficients on the proxy variables are estimated consistently. The first condition is that the proxy variable should be redundant in the structural equation. Using the subsample of entrepreneurs that do experience an acquisition exit, I show empirically that, given the true acquirer market, citation-based measures of market structure are not predictive of innovation ex-post. This implies that the market structure of acquirers is indeed the mechanism that incentivizes innovation and catering. The second condition is that conditional on the proxy, the acquirer market structure and the other regressors are not jointly determined by further factors.
I measure the acquirer market structure using both citers' concentration and citers' market size.
The HHI of an industry k is defined as:
where s i represents the market share of firm i in industry k. HHI measures the size of firms in relation to the industry and indicates the amount of competition among them. Thus, HHI can range from 0 to 1, moving from perfect competition to a monopolistic industry. Increases in the HHI indicate a decrease in competition and an increase in market power.
For each start-up entrepreneur i, the acquirer market concentration is defined as:
where Citations i,k,t−5 represents the number of citations received by entrepreneur i from firms in industry k in the four years between t − 5 and the year before start-up founding t − 1. captures the common phenomenon that many start-ups end up acquired by companies or industries at which the entrepreneurs previously worked. Second, the companies that cite entrepreneur i more frequently receive more weight in the calculation of acquirer market concentration. This captures the intuition that companies who cite a certain patent more often have more "use" for said patent and would likely experience higher returns to a possible acquisition. Last, the construction of acquirer markets does not rely solely on the traditional product market classifications (SIC) but instead accounts for the technology space of firms. Indeed, to the extent that most acquisitions cross industry lines, studying purely horizontal mergers is not informative. 18 
CEM Matching
The main empirical strategy employs the coarsened exact matching procedure (Iacus et al. 2011)
to construct treatment and control groups balanced on pretreatment covariates. 19 The primary reason I chose to use CEM instead of a propensity score method was that CEM offers the ability to select the balance of the treatment and control group ex-ante. The purpose of this strategy is to identify control groups that follow a parallel trend to treatment groups, had the treatment not occurred. I exploit the employment and patent histories of entrepreneurs by focusing on two sets of pretreatment variables: entrepreneur innovativeness and prior industry before start-up founding at time t.
Specifically, I implement this by dividing the sample into two groups (high and low), based on the mean of the proxy variable, HHI citers i,t . For each entrepreneur i with HHI citer i,t in the high group, I employ CEM to identify a similar entrepreneur j with HHI citer j,t in the low group. The entrepreneurs are similar in the sense that they work in the same SIC three-digit industry from t−5
to t, and they possess the same number of patents and citations per patent during that time.
The ideal experiment in my setting would be to flip a coin for each entrepreneur. If the coin lands on heads, the entrepreneur is assigned a concentrated acquirer market. If the coin lands on tails, the entrepreneur is assigned a competitive acquirer market. However, I am concerned that an entrepreneur's choice of past and future industries is correlated with his or her innovation. If this choice of prior or current industry is non-random, this will generate a bias in the β 1 coefficient of interest. For example, higher ability entrepreneurs may choose to enter into more competitive industries and maintain a higher level of ex-post innovation. Using citers of prior patents assigned to the entrepreneurs only partially alleviates this concern. Higher ability entrepreneurs may also choose to enter into prior industries differentially, in which case, the proxy remains susceptible to the same bias.
Matching on prior innovativeness at least partially addresses the potential that highly innovative people tend to systematically self-select into more (or less) competitive industries. Matching on prior industry addresses the potential that selection into prior industries is correlated with selection into expected industries and innovation. Matching on industry along with industry FE breaks this link between market choices elected by the entrepreneur and the acquisition market. The only variation that remains in the specification is variation that is orthogonal to innovation residualsrestricted to the proxies of innovativeness used in the analysis.
Instead of flipping a coin for each entrepreneur, I now flip a coin for each pair of matched entrepreneurs. With just one flip, I can "randomly" assign one entrepreneur to a concentrated acquirer market and another to a competitive acquirer market. The key identifying assumption is that HHI citer i,j,t is randomly assigned to entrepreneurs conditional on matching.
i,t ⊥ HHI citers i,j,t |SIC i,t−1 , Innov i,pre−t This implies that, for a given innovativeness of entrepreneur i and a given industry that entrepreneur i works in at time t − 1, the assigned concentration of potential acquirers resembles an assignment by coin toss. Put differently, the underlying assumption for this methodology is that there are no additional correlates of unobserved entrepreneur characteristics and the market structure of prior citers. By removing entrepreneur observations that fail to have a match, I am removing observations that are "different" and thus, most susceptible to selection bias.
To solidify our understanding of the identification strategy, imagine two entrepreneurs, Tony (again) and Sean. Tony and Sean had both worked in the same industry before pursuing entrepreneurship.
They had also produced the same number of patents with the same number of forward citations before becoming start-up founders. However, their patents received citations from companies in differentially concentrated industries. Thus, they faced two different potential acquirer markets. Innov i,t = β 0 + β 1 HHI citers i,t + β 2 Innov i,t−5 + ζ j,t−5 + ζ j,t + σ t + i,t
Innov i,t−5 is a vector of patent variables that controls for innovation before start-up founding from t − 5 to t − 1. In all specifications, I use both prior patent count and prior citations per patent to measure pre-innovation. I also control for SIC industry (pre-and post-) and time fixed effects -ζ j,t−5 , ζ j,t , and σ t , respectively. Note that since sample observations are already matched on prior innovation and SIC industry, controlling for Innov i,t−5 and pre-entrepreneurship industry fixed effects will not affect the consistency of our estimator but may improve efficiency.
I employ the same empirical methodology using Size citers i,t as a measure of acquirer market structure. Furthermore, I show results incorporating both measures.
Innov i,t = β 0 + β 1 HHI citers i,t + β 2 Size citers i,t + β 3 Innov i,t−5 + ζ j,t−5 + ζ j,t + σ t + i,t
Heckman Selection Model
The proxy variable and CEM address potential selection within the sample. Another important question concerns the degree of selection into the sample, i.e., the determinants of the propensity of inventors to become entrepreneurs. If entrepreneurs position their innovation to be attractive acquisition targets, they will also position their entrepreneurship choices. For example, if a concentrated acquiring market deters low-quality inventors from becoming entrepreneurs, the quality of entrepreneurs in those industries would be higher because the low end of the distribution would be missing. To address this concern, I employ the two-stage Heckman correction model for selection. In the first stage, I construct my proxy variable for every inventor across time using the full patent database. Each observation represents an inventor-year pair associated with a specific HHI citer i,t
and Size citer i,t . The outcome variable is a dummy variable E it for whether inventor i enters entrepreneurship at time t. The specification is as follows:
where Z is a vector of explanatory variables including Innov i,t−5 , industry, and time fixed effects. In the second stage, I use the transformation of the predicted individual probabilities as an additional explanatory variable:
Innov i,t = β 1 HHI citer i,t + β 2 Size citers i,t + β 3 Innov i,t−5
While this methodology directly addresses concerns about entrepreneurial selection, it also provides an answer to an important question in both the industrial organization and entrepreneurship literature. The first stage is a direct test of the impact of market structure on entry.
Empirical Results

Summary Statistics
The York. Table I shows the dispersion of start-ups across geographic space. Table II 
Matched Proxy Regressions on Innovation
I investigate whether and how the acquisition market impacts innovation output and catering of the entrepreneur after start-up founding. I run the initial regressions using the patent count, citations per patent, and technological proximity measure as the dependent variables. Table IV all specifications, acquirer concentration produces no statistically significant effect on patent count after entrepreneurial founding.
The coefficient on HHI citer is always negative but statistically indistinguishable from zero. This implies that facing a more concentrated acquisition industry does not lead to more innovation in terms of patent count. The coefficient on Size citer is positive and slightly significant in Column 4. However, this coefficient loses significance in a specification with HHI citer in Column 5.
In other words, post-entrepreneurship patent output appears unaffected. One potential explanation is that both escape competition and scaling forces are at play: Concentrated and large industries may generate more acquisition surplus due to scaling, while competitive industries may experience a greater need for innovation in order to capture market share. Thus, the competing forces may simply generate a net 0 effect on the incentives of the entrepreneur to pursue innovation.
In terms of the control variables, each additional prior patent increases future patent innovation, whereas prior citations produce no effect on future patent production. This is unsurprising since inventors who patent before entrepreneurship are likely to continue patenting after entrepreneurship.
Turning to my measure of innovation quality, I use log citations per patent as the right-hand side variable in Table V . Here, I estimate a significant impact of market structure. In Column 1, increasing HHI citer from perfectly competitive to monopolistic leads to a 122% increase in average forward citation per patent. This is both large in magnitude and statistically significant at the 1% level. The average concentration for an acquiring industry is 0.233 with standard deviation 0.128 implying that a one standard deviation increase in concentration will increase citations by approximately 15-16%. Given that the average number of citations per patent in the sample is 13, this implies that, when comparing a concentrated industry such as pharmaceuticals to a more competitive industry such as software, the quality of patents produced by entrepreneurs increases by two citations per patent. Even with the addition of fixed effects in Columns 2 and 3, the coefficient on HHI citer remains constant and significant, alleviating concerns of selection on unobservables.
In Column 4, I re-run the specification with Size citer as a proxy for market structure. Increasing size by one standard deviation increases average citations per patent by 9%. When I account for both dimensions of acquirer market structure in Column 5, I find HHI citer maintains a 15% effect on citations, controlling for market size. Size maintains a 7% effect on citations.
The results in Table V The coefficient on the VC dummy is also positive and significant, implying that VC investment incentivizes innovation output by entrepreneurs. Interestingly, this effect is similar in magnitude to that which the existing literature on the role of venture capital on innovation. However, it
is unclear to what extent the estimate reflects the causal impact of venture capital funding on innovation versus venture capitalists selecting highly innovative firms.
Finally, I test whether increasing concentration leads to catering. Do entrepreneurs either engage in proximal innovation relative to potential acquirers in order to increase technological synergies in an acquisition, or in differentiated innovation in order to avoid cannibalization of previous products? Table VI shows that if acquirer concentration increases, technological proximity between the entrepreneur and potential acquirers increases as well. Entrepreneurs facing acquirers in concentrated industries tend to innovate in technology areas in which potential acquirers are also innovating. A one standard deviation increase in HHI citer increases technological proximity by 9%, while a one standard deviation in size increases technological proximity by 5%.
These economic magnitudes suggest that entrepreneurs position for acquisitions in concentrated markets by shifting their innovation in the direction of potential acquirers. By innovating in the same technological areas as potential acquirers, entrepreneurs position their inventions for the acquirer to easily utilize and scale.
I now move back one step further in the inventor's decision making process and account for acquisition markets affecting the propensity of inventors to become entrepreneurs. In numerous prior studies concerning the determinants of entrepreneurship, a key challenge is to establish a starting sample of potential entrepreneurs. What is the relevant sample of people to study? Here, I
have a natural starting sample -inventors. That said, I cannot speak to the entire universe of entrepreneurs, but only to patenting entrepreneurs. 21 
First Stage: Entrepreneurship
I employ a standard two-stage Heckman selection model to address the selection of entrepreneurs.
The first stage is a probit with the outcome variable being a dummy variable for entrepreneurship.
The specification is:
where Z is a vector of explanatory variables including Innov i,t−5 , industry and time fixed effects.
This specification uses variation across inventors and across time to identify whether market structure affects the decisions of inventors to become entrepreneurs. Table VII shows that entry into entrepreneurship is higher when industries are less concentrated.
A one standard deviation increase in HHI citer decreases entrepreneurship by 4%. Size produces a similar effect. This is consistent with two anecdotal facts. First, fragmented markets attract more entry. Facing concentrated acquisition markets presents a higher risk of potential acquirers extending into the product market with or without the inventor. As a result, inventors are more hesitant to "face off" against large monopolists in the case of no acquisitions. Second, even if the possibility of acquisition is high, entrepreneurs facing monopolists are unlikely to extract a high acquisition price due to the lack of outside options and low bargaining power. A low acquisition price deters inventors from entering into entrepreneurship, as compared to staying in the waged labor market.
Second Stage: Innovation (Conditional on Entry)
In the second stage, I rerun the previous specification but incorporate transformation of the predicted individual probabilities as an additional explanatory variable: The information technology sector is the driver of the new economy and is particularly relevant to the changing landscape of entrepreneurial finance. (3) and (4) show the results on log citations per patent while Columns (5) and (6) show the results on technological proximity. The magnitudes are similar to the full specification.
Subsample Analysis
The results also extend to the medical/biotech sector ( Second, scaling may produce non-linear benefits. Since the medical/biotech sector is dominated by heavily concentrated potential acquirers, the benefits of scale and monopoly power are even larger.
While I find that the results are generalizable across both the information technology and the medical/biotech sectors, the results do not seem to hold in the non-high technology sector. This can either be because incentives are driven by a different exit model in the non-high technology sector or because I lack sufficient observations and thus, the statistical power to obtain precision on the point estimates.
Conclusion
Despite recent academic and industry focus, relatively little academic work explores the determinants of innovation in finance, and in particular, within the start-up setting. In this paper, building on Schumpeter's ideas, I propose market structure as a key determinant of entrepreneurship and innovation. The distinction in this paper is to suggest a different channel for the role of market structure -specifically, by affecting acquisition surplus and premiums.
The bulk of the current paper focuses on developing and testing an empirical strategy free of endogeneity and selection problems. I construct an entirely new dataset comprising entrepreneurs from CrunchBase and their employment history from LinkedIn, which I match to their patents from EPO Patstat and the NBER patent database. I proxy for acquirer markets utilizing citers of an entrepreneur's prior patents with the intuition that ex-ante, the most likely acquirers are the people most interested in prior patents. I test and confirm these conditions.
I find consistent and causal effects of market structure on entrepreneurship and start-up innovation. Notes Table II is the average citation per patent attributed to the entrepreneur before start-up founding. VC dummy is an indicator variable for whether an entrepreneur received venture capital investment. Industry (Pre) FE controls for the entrepreneur's prior three-digit SIC industry while Industry (Post) FE controls for the three-digit SIC industry after start-up founding. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table VI reports estimates from OLS regressions using the matched sample. The technological proximity measure is an average of the patent overlap between the entrepreneur and potential acquirers. HHI citer and Size citer are entrepreneur-specific proxy variables capturing the level of competition and market size of acquirers. The variable Patents t-5,t-1 is the entrepreneur's patent count before start-up founding. The variable Citations t-5,t-1 is the average citation per patent attributed to the entrepreneur before start-up founding. VC dummy is an indicator variable for whether an entrepreneur received venture capital investment. Industry (Pre) FE controls for the entrepreneur's prior three-digit SIC industry while Industry (Post) FE controls for the three-digit SIC industry after start-up founding. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. included. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Notes Table IX-C shows matched regression results for a subsample of data. This sample is of entrepreneurs with start-ups in the non-high-technology industry. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Tables
